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Dye: Disabilities Tolling
the Statute
Limitations OF
DISABILITIES
TOLLING
THEofSTATUTE
LIMITATIONS IN MONTANA
Basically, there are five fundamental social purposes behind limiting the right to bring an action to some artifical period of years. First,
and most fundamental, such limitations tend to prevent the failures
of justice which might occur in the trial of "stale" claims. Second, the
statutes provide a means for legislatively defining and thus making
certain what is a "reasonable time" for bringing any given action.
Third, where vindication in open court is a reason for the existence
of the action, such statutes tend to limit the action to the period where
the wrong exists in the public memory.' Fourth, statutes of limitation
provide a means of discouraging actions which tend to conflict with
some broader policy by assigning them a short period of limitation.'
Finally, the statutes tend to reduce the amount and complexity of the
litigation handled by the courts.
However, the fundamental imperative behind such statutes-that a
person must be diligent in asserting his rights-loses its validity if the
person in whose favor the action accrues is under a disability which
makes it difficult or impossible for him to maintain the action. As a
result, from early times ' legislatures have determined that the interests
of allowing such a person to assert his rights have outweighed the
social purposes behind the statutes and have carved out partial or total
exemptions from their effect in his favor.
As will be seen, these exceptions are no less arbitrary than the
statutes of limitation themselves. They can and do lead to injustice
in individual cases, and the most that can be said for them is that they
tend to promote valid social goals broadly and in the long run. The
purpose of this Note is to examine the Montana statutes together with
the limited number of cases construing them and to attempt to point
out some of the possible pitfalls into which the unwary might fall.
THE STATUTES
The sections of the Montana Code which constitute the general
statutes of limitation 4 were enacted on a piecemeul basis over a period
of approximately thirty years beginning with the Bannack Statutes
and culminating with the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 1895. There have
been few amendments since that time.
These sections are divided into two principal parts, actions for

'Libel and slander are prime example. REVISED CODES OF

MONTANA, 1947 [hereinafter
RCM] 93-2603 (3) (two years).
'Most of the actions assigned a one-year (RCM 93-2603) or six-month (RCM 93-2609)
period of limitations are of this character. The "broader policy" favored in such
statutes is making government more effective by freeing it from having to contend
with the possibility of litigation for an extended period of time.
'Stat. 21 James I, c. 16.
'RCM93-2401 through 93-2720.
IRCM 93-2501 through 93-2516.
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the recovery of real property 5 and all other actions. 6 The periods of
limitations prescribed range from six months to ten years. Special
statutes of limitation are specifically excluded from the scope of these
7
general provisions.
The disabilities" denominated as such in the statutes are infancy,
insanity, and imprisonment on a criminal charge or for a term of less
than life.9 The absence of a party from the jurisdiction is provided for
in two sections1 ° although it is not termed nor treated as a "disability."
The common law disability of coverture does not exist in Montana."
Montana law specifically provides that in order for the statute to
be tolled, a disability must exist at the time the right of action accrues.' 2
By inference, the "tacking" of successive disabilities, whether in the
same person or in successors in interest, 3 would not be allowed. However, if a person is under two or more co-existing disabilities at the
time the action accrues, the statute is tolled until all of them are
4
removed.'
The above-mentioned provisions apply only to the denominated disabilities of infancy, insanity, and imprisonment. The absence of the
defendant from the state or alienage in time of war operates as a
complete exemption from the operation of the statute.15
TIME OF SUSPENSION
Basically disability provisions are of two types. They may
provide for a complete suspension of the statute of limitations, 6 or they
may provide for some sort of end limitation on the period of suspension.
In Montana, both denominated disability provisions contain such a
limitation.

6RCM 93-2601 through 93-2618.
7
RCM 93-2401.
ORCM 93-2515 (real property actions) and 93-2703 (other actions).
OThe exception for persons under sentence of life imprisonment is presumably because
such persons are "civilly dead." ROM 94-4721.
1
"These are RCM 93-2702 which suspends the statute when the defendant is out of the
state and 93-2707 which suspends the statute when one party is a subject of a state
at war with the United States.
nRCM 93-2803.
2
1RCM 93-2710.
13Cf. Commercial Trust Co. v. Jordan, 85 Mont. 375, 388, 278 P. 832, 835 (1929)
(statute of limitations not suspended by the death of a person having a right of action
because of the minority of his heirs).
"4RCM 93-211.
"RCM 93-2702 (absence of defendant from state); 93-2707 (alienage in time of war).
"As in the case of alienage in time of war or the absence of the defendant from the
state. Id.
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The real property disability statute 17 provides that the statute does
not commence running until the disability ceases or the death of the
party except that the action must be brought within five years of the
termination of the disability or death of the party. For all practical
purposes, however, this section operates as a complete suspension since
all real property actions' 8 except actions by one claiming under letters
20
9
patent or grants from the state' or actions for the recovery of dower
must be brought withiii five years 21 and such actions are not currently of
great importance.
The disability provision for "other actions

'2 2

is more ambiguous.

23

Basically it provides that the statute is tolled during the period of the
disability. 24 To this are added limitations that, except in the case of
minority, the statute cannot be extended for more than five years and
that in any event the action must be brought within one year after the
disability ceases. The effect of these provisions, given the variables of

'7RCM 93-2515. CERTAIN DISABILITIES EXCLUDED FROM TIME TO COMMENCE ACTIONS. If a person entitled to commence an action for the recovery of
real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, or for dower, or to make
any entry or defense founded on the title to real property, or to rents or services out
of the same, is at the same time such title first descends or accrues, either
1. Within the age of majority; or,
2. Insane; or,
3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a
criminal offense, for a term of less than for life.
The time during which disability continues is not deemed any portion of the
time in this chapter limited for the commencement of such action, or the making of
such entry or defense, but such action may be commenced, or entry or defense made,
within the period of five (5) years after such disability shall cease, or after the
death of the person entitled, who shall die under such disability; but such action
shall not be commenced or entry, or defense made, after that period.
"RCM 93-2504 through 93-2507; 93-2512.
19RCM 93-2502.
wRCM 93-2504.
'Actions brought by the state itself are also limited to ten years but obviously the
disability provisions would not apply to it. RCM 93-2501.
2RCM 93-2703. EXCEPTIONS AS TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITIES. If a
person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in sections 93-2601 to 93-2609 or sections 93-2613 to 93-2618, be, at the time the action accrues, either:
1. Within the age of majority; or,
2. Insane; or,
3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a
criminal court for a term less than for life;
the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited in sections 93-2401
93-2720 for commencing the action; except that the time so limited cannot be extended
more than five years by any such disability, except infancy; or, in any case, more
than one year after the disability ceases.
"That is sufficiently ambiguous so as to cause litigation in an area which calls for
, 460 P.2d
Mont..
clarity. State ex. rel. Hi-Ball Contractors v. District Court ....
751 (1969).
754.
21Id.byatScholarWorks
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the disability ending before or after the usual period of limitations or
25
not at all, are set forth in a table in the margin.
INFANCY
The reasons for the disability of infancy must be understood as
being largely historical and conceptual in nature. It is a relic from a
time when children were customarily placed "on their own" at a tender
age and even then was the result of the common law judges' dichotomy
between "adults" and "infants." In the present day, parents tend to be
quite diligent in asserting their children's rights at least until they are
of such an age that they can hardly be considered "infants." Logically,
it would seem that minority is less of a handicap than many "disabilities," such as subsequently acquired insanity or physical incapacity,
which are not mentioned by the statutes. 28
Nevertheless, minors receive more complete protection under the
27
disability statutes than any other group. As was previously mentioned,
the statute is completely suspended during the period of minority with
no end limitation. Thus, a two-year-old boy who has a tort claim for
personal injuries has twenty years 2 to bring this action compared to
three years for a person not under a disability 29 and a maximum of eight
years for a person suffering from insanity. 0
INSANITY
The second of the denominated disabilities is insanity. The term
"insane" is not defined anywhere in the Codes, but elsewhere "persons
idiots, lunatics, imbeciles, and
of unsound mind" is defined as "...
habitual drunkards."8 1

Infancy. In all cases of minority, the period of limitations is the longer of:
A. the usual period of limitations, or
B. the period of minority remaining plus one year or the period of limitations if it is less than one year.
II. Insanity and imprisonment.
A. Where the disability ends within the usual period of limitations, the period
of limitations is the shorter of
a) the usual period of limitations plus the time the person was under the
disability.
b) the usual period of limitations plus five years.
B. Where the disability ceases after the usual period of limitations, the period
is the shorter of
a) the usual period of limitations plus the time the person was under the
disability, or
b) the usual period of limitations plus five years or
c) the time the person was under the disability plus one year.
C. In any event, the period of limitations is absolutely limited to the usual
period of limitations plus five years even if the disability never ceases.
"Minors are males under twenty-one and females under eighteen years of age. RCM
64-101.
-"Note 25 supra.
2Id.
-RCM 93-2605 (3).
aNote 25 supra.
t
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/7
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Obviously, with such an imprecise definition the determination of
who is "insane" will have to await a case by case adjudication. It is
apparent that the legislature intended to include the mentally retarded
("imbeciles") and alcoholics ("habitual drunkards") as well as persons
suffering from mental illness in the statutory definition. However, any
further analysis of the elements of "insanity" within the savings clause
to the statute would be futile. There have been no Montana cases, and
decisions from other jurisdictions are of little value because of their
82
limited number and the great variety of statutory definitions.
In any event, it seems clear that the statute includes both adjudicated and unadjudicated insanity. This is the majority, if not the universal rule, in this country 3 and the relevant statutes8 4 do not appear
to confine "persons of unsound mind" to persons declared legally insane.
Moreover, it would hardly seem in accord with the policy behind the
saving clause to deny an obviously incompetent person its benefits
merely because he has not been formally declared non compos mentis.
One specialized problem deserves mention. That is whether insanity
which arises simultaneously with the right of action tolls the statute of
limitation.
R.C.M. 93-2710 states "[n]o person can avail himself of a disability,
unless it existed when his right of action or entry accrued." [emphasis
supplied]. This would tend to imply that such a disability must have
been in existence at the time the right of action accrued.
However, in face of a nearly identical statute85 the California District Court of Appeal held that:
Where
another
follows
accrues
against

insanity is caused by the wrongful act of negligence of
and occurs simultaneously with such act or negligence, it
that such disability exists at the time the cause of action
and the statute of limitations does not commence to run
the cause of action.3

The question is therefore an open one in Montana with the literal
language of the statute pointing in one direction and persuasive authority from another jurisdiction in the other.
On analysis, however, the position of the California court appears
to be the preferable one. The basic social purpose behind not allowing a
subsequently acquired disability to toll the statute is that there is no
convenient and readily determinable cutoff point after the right of
action arises. A person who becomes insane one day before the statute

nWhat little authority there is is collected in 9 A.L.R.2d 964.
sBrowne v. Smith, 119 Colo. 469, 205 P.2d 239 (1949).
84E.g. R.C.M. 64-111; 64-112.
"CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PRO
M

section 357 (West 1954).

Weinstoek v. Eissler, 224 Cal.App.2d 212, 36 Cal.Rptr. 537, 551-2 (1964).
v. Minnesota Iron Co., 102 Minn. 89, 112 N.W. 880 (1907).
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runs would be as much entitled to toll it as one who became insane one
day after the action accrued. In such a situation the legislature has
made a determination that the social interests in cutting off the possibility of litigation outweighs the interests of a person who has had some
time while competent to assert his rights.
These policy considerations do not apply to a situation where the
right of action and the disability occur simultaneously. The time the
action accrues furnishes a natural cutoff point and a person who is
rendered insane by the wrongful act has no more opportunity to assert
his rights than a person whose incompetency pre-existed the action.
EFFECT OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN
Although the issue has not been litigated in Montana, the majority
rule elsewhere is that the appointment of a guardian does not start the
statute of limitations running against his ward whether the ward is
insane 3 or a minor 38 or whether the guardianship is general3 9 or ad
litem. 40
Such holdings have often been accompanied by dicta that a differ41
ent result would follow if the right of action were in the guardian.
However, as was pointed out in Aronson v. Bank of America National
Trust and Saving Association,42 a guardian qua guardian's only duty is
that of caretaker of the person or property of his ward. He has no
interest in any action other than as guardian of the rights of another.
Statutes which allow him to sue in his own name 43 are procedural only,
an exception to the rule that actions are to be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest.44 It would seem, therefore, that the exception
would apply, if at all, only if the guardian, in addition to his duties as
guardian, held property in trust for his ward or in some other way was
possessed of the legal title to the res.
As was stated previously, this exact point has not been decided in
Montana. However, in Lamont v. Vinger 45 it was held that the failure
of an administrator to maintain an action to recover real property did
not bar an action by the minor heirs even though the statute of limitations had long since run on the administrator. 46 In the course of the
decision, the Court assumed that the administrator and the heirs had a

t

Gottesman v. Simon, 169 Cal.App.2d 494, 337 P.2d 906, 912 (1959).
sAronson v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assn., 65 P.2d 823 (Dist.
Ct. of App.), rev. on other grounds 9 Cal.2d 640, 72 P.2d 548 (1937).
ld.
0
' Klosky v. Dick, 359 Mich. 615, 103 N.W.2d 618, 621 (1960).
"In re Sheehan's Estate, 290 Ill.App. 551, 9 N.E.2d 63, 65-6 (1963).
'!Note 38 supra.
"E.g., MONT. R. CIV. PRO. 17(a).
"Note 40 supra.
4561 Mont. 530, 202 P. 769 (1921).
"Id. at 61 Mont. 538, 202 P. 771.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/7
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joint right to maintain the
Montana Court has, at least
the majority rule which is
gence of those persons who

NOTES

action. 47 It would seem, therefore, that the
by implication, adopted the rationale behind
the protection of the minor from the negliare supposed to act for him.

IMPRISONMENT
In order for a person to be "imprisoned" within the meaning of
the savings clause, he must be in actual legal confinement at the time the
right of action accrues. 48 Thus a person who is free on bond is not within
the savings clause even if he is subsequently convicted and imprisoned. 49
The same is true if a person is paroled 5° or on probation.5 1
The primary thrust of this clause is not designed to alleviate
the practical problems which a convict would have in vindicating his
rights. These would exist regardless of when the person was actually confined. Rather, the statute is aimed at the fact that a convict does not
have a reasonable opportunity to discover that he has a right of action
against another. Without such a savings clause, such a person's rights
might be lost not through neglect to prosecute his action or even ignorance
of his legal rights but from ignorance of the fact of the act itself.
SPECIAL STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The Montana Codes set forth some thirty-three special periods of
limitation which are set forth in the Appendix. Although the issue
has not been passed upon in Montana, it is virtually certain that the
general disability savings clause does not apply to such special statutes. 52
This is unfortunate because the same policy considerations which
apply to allowing an exception for the general statutes of limitations
in favor of persons under certain disabilities, apply to at least some of
the special statutes also. 53 What is more unfortunate is that the situation

appears to have resulted from legislative oversight.

"Id.

"'Note 12 supra.
"Bock v. Collier, 175 Ore. 145, 151 P.2d 732, 735 (1944).
'Mitchell v. Greenough, 100 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. den. 306 U.S. 659
(1939).
"'Carter v. Associated Transfer and Storage Co., 410 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Ct. App.,
1966).

'This is for a number of reasons. First, ROM 93-2401 specifically excludes special
statutes from the provisions of the chapters covering general limitations. Second,
both of the general disability saving clauses, RMC 93-2515 and 93-2703, more or less
expressly, limit themselves to covering the general statutes which precede them. Supra,
notes 17 and 22, respectively. Finally, four of the special limitations provisions contain their own disability saving clauses, which further negates a legislative intent to
include all the special statutes within th egeneral saving provisions. RMC 91-1101,
91-3036, 91-5207, 91-5208.
'The best example is RCM 87A-6-111 which places a special limitation of four years
on any action for breach of a contract of sale. Although it is true that this section
provides that I I[t]his section does not alter the law on tolling the statute of limitations .. ." it is questionable whether this provision is sufficient to adopt the general
saving clause
in view of of
itsMontana,
inclusive nature.
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The general disability savings clauses have not been amended since
1895. At that time the statutes exhibited a certain consistent and logical
pattern. The special statutes were few in number and many had special
disability provisions. 54 Those that did not were mostly limitations on lien
foreclosures55 or actions against governmental units 6 in which exclusion
of a savings clause could be justified in terms of public policy.
Since that time special statutes of limitations, enacted for special
purposes, have proliferated. Moreover, the situation is not likely to
improve since Model and Uniform Acts are increasingly given to including special statutes as a part of their comprehensive format. And
such acts are tending to cover broader and broader areas of the law.
This is not to berate the special statutes of limitations as a means
of social policy. But if the state determines that individuals laboring
under certain disabilities are to be exempted from the period of limitations,
such an exemption should apply to all actions unless some overriding reason compels otherwise.
HAROLD V. DYE

APPENDIX
MONTANA SPECIAL STATUTES OF LIMITATION
SECTION
9-604
11-1310
11-2239
11-2911
15-2298
21-130
45-410
45-419
45-510
45-805
45-910
48-203
52-206
52-407
72-131
83-602

RCM 1947

ACTION

PERIOD

Actions against a mausoleum-columborium authority relating
to the remains of a person left in their possession ......................... 2 years
Presentment of claims to a city or town. ...................................... 1 year
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest to Special Improvem ent Districts .................................................................................
60 days
Actions against grantee of a deed issued by an incorporated
city or town after platting pursuant to sections 11-2901
through 11-2911 R.C.M---.......................................................................... 2 years
Actions against dissolved corporations ...................
.......... 5 years
Actions for divorce on grounds of adultery or conviction of
a felony ...................................................................................................... 2 years
Actions to foreclose logger's liens .............................................
8 months
Actions to foreclose lien for driving logs ........................................ 60 days
Actions to foreclose mechanic's liens ................................... 2 years
Actions to foreclose thresherman's lien .......................................... 6 months
Actions to foreclose crop duster's lien .........................................
90 days
Actions for annulment of marriage .....................
2 or 4 years
Period of real property mortgage lien ......................................
8 years
Period for foreclosure of real estate trust ..................................
8 years
Actions by railroads to recover charges ........................
3 years
Contract actions against state after exhausion of administrative remedies ...............................................
1 year

5

CODE OF CIVIL PROcEDuRE O' 1895 (hereinafter Code of Civ. Pro.)
sections 2360, 2705, 3055, 3056 (presently RCM 91-1101, 91-3036, 91-5207, 91-5208).
56E.g. Code of Civ. Pro. sections 2139 and 3946 (presently RCM 45-419, 45-510).
5E.g. MONTANA POLITICAL CODE OF 1895 sections 4024 and 4212 (presently RCM 84-4502,
11-1301).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/7
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84-726
84-4501
84-4502
84-4920
84-4922
84-4923.1
87A-2-725*
87A-6-111
89-1715
91-308
91-1101
91-308
91-3036*
91-5207*
91-520 8*
93-6504
93-2901-3
*Contains

271

Period for filing claims for refund of overpayment of inheritance and other taxes from State Board of Equalization ................. 5 years
....................
60 days
Actions to recover license fees paid under protest
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest .....................................
60 days
5 years
Period for state to revise income tax returns ....................................
Period for taxpayer to revise income tax return ..-..........................
5 years
Period for judicial review of State Board of Equalization ....... 6 mouths
4 years
Actions for breach of contract for sale of goods .............................
6 months
Actions under Bulk Sale Law ...........................................................
Actions attacking decree of court creating or modifying an
irrigation district . ......................................................................................
1 year
Actions by persons claiming real property under a will
4 years
against good faith purchasers from an heir .....................................
6 months
Actions contesting probate or the validity of a will .....................
Actions for recovery of an estate sold by an heir .............................
4 years
Actions for recovery of an estate sold by an executor or ad3 years
ministrator . -...............................................................................................
3 years
Actions against sureties on a guardian's bond .................................
Actions by ward for recovery of property sold by guardian ......... 3 years
1 year
yea.......................
Actions against boats
Actions for accrued education and support of illegitimate
4 years
children .4..................................... ...............................................................

a special disability saving clause.
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